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COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY v. WYNNE: BRIDGING THE 
GAP BETWEEN STRANDS OF JURISPRUDENCE 
ON STATE INCOME TAXATION 
DANIEL BOSWORTH∗ 
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne1 the United States Supreme 
Court upheld a Maryland Court of Appeals decision in holding that the 
State of Maryland’s2 “county tax” on income earned out of state, without a 
credit for taxes paid to the host state, violated the Commerce Clause.3  The 
majority opinion, authored by Justice Samuel Alito, is the culmination of a 
long-standing strand of Commerce Clause jurisprudence arguing that the 
Court should use the Commerce Clause actively in order to protect 
interstate commerce from discrimination by double taxation.4  The principal 
dissent, on the other hand, authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, 
follows an equally valid strand of jurisprudence in arguing for the states to 
retain the sovereignty to tax all of their residents’ income and to defer to the 
political process whenever possible.5  The competition between these 
strands of jurisprudence has resulted in staggeringly inconsistent decisions 
on state taxation issues.6  Rather than bridging the gap between these 
distinct pillars of Supreme Court jurisprudence to create a test that 
generates replicable results, the Wynne Court simply chose to reprise its 
long-at-odds strands of jurisprudence. 
By holding that Maryland’s tax scheme violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court, in Wynne, granted tax refunds to 
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 1.  135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
 2.  The State of Maryland is hereinafter referred to as “Maryland” or the “State.” 
 3.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
 4.  See infra Part III.A.  This collection of jurisprudence will be referred to as the “Wynne 
majority strand” of jurisprudence and the “Wynne majority wing” of the Court. 
 5.  See infra Part III.A.  This collection of jurisprudence will be referred to as the “Wynne 
dissent strand” of jurisprudence and the “Wynne dissent wing” of the Court. 
 6.  See infra Part II. 
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more than 55,000 Maryland residents.7  The Court’s decision to strike down 
this instance of double taxation was incorrect8 and has created a significant 
burden on both the State of Maryland and its counties.9  By failing to 
reconcile the competing strands of jurisprudence, the Court missed an 
opportunity to create a consistent and predictable method for deciding state 
tax-related Commerce Clause cases10 by incorporating the fundamental 
principles that each strand of jurisprudence values11 as well as the central 
aspects of their Commerce Clause decisions.12 
Montgomery County, the jurisdiction most severely impacted by the 
Court’s desire to eliminate all instances of double taxation, will foot the bill 
for over half of the expected $200 million that will be paid out to taxpayers 
in refunds.13  Montgomery County Executive Isaiah Leggett warned that the 
Wynne decision would create an economic situation in his county that 
would “in some ways be worse than the recession” and would cause “a 
permanent hit” to the state budget.14  There is even talk of raising other 
taxes in the county in order to offset the lost revenue.15  However, Maryland 
is not the only state affected by the Wynne decision.  States such as New 
York, Pennsylvania, Indiana and Ohio, with tax laws similar to that of 
Maryland, might also be forced to credit their residents for moneys owed.16 
                                                          
 7.  Brian White, Hogan Urges Eligible Md. Residents to Apply for Tax Refund, BALT. SUN 
(Sept. 28, 2015), www.baltimoresun.com/news/nation-world/sns-bc-md—supreme-court-
maryland-income-tax-20150928-story.html.  
 8.  See infra text accompanying notes 149–151.  
 9.  Bill Turque, Maryland Prepares for $200 Million Hit from Supreme Court Tax Case, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/maryland-
prepares-for-200-million-hit-from-supreme-court-tax-case/2015/04/10/be832130-def2-11e4-a500-
1c5bb1d8ff6a_story.html.  
 10.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 11.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 12.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 13.  Turque, supra note 9.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id.  Although Montgomery County officials lamented the decision, Maryland’s Governor, 
Larry Hogan, vehemently voiced his support for the Supreme Court’s decision despite the hit to 
Maryland’s budget.  White, supra note 7.  Hogan stated, “I wholeheartedly believe that this money 
will do more good in the hands of our citizens that it will do in the hands of government.”  Id.  
The state created a website, wynnetaxrefund.maryland.gov, in order to give residents information 
about how to collect their refund.  Id.  
 16.  John Fritze & Luke Broadwater, Supreme Court: Md. Has Double Taxed Some Income, 
BALT. SUN (May 18, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/blog/bal-
supreme-court-md-has-double-taxed-some-income-20150518-story.html.  
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I.  THE CASE 
A.  The Wynnes and Maryland’s Income Tax 
In 2006, Bryan Wynne was one of seven owners of an “S-
Corporation,”17 Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (“Maxim”), that earned 
income in thirty-nine states.18  Mr. Wynne owned 2.4% of the company’s 
stock.19  Because Maxim was treated as an S-corporation, the company’s 
income “passed-through” to its owners for income tax purposes under 
Maryland law, and the Wynnes reported such pass-through income on their 
2006 Maryland tax return.20 
Maryland law imposes a three part income tax on individuals:  
(1) [a] State income tax (the ‘state tax’) at a rate set by the 
Legislature in statute,21 (2) a county income tax that applies to 
only residents of each county [and Baltimore City] (the ‘county 
tax’) at a rate set by the county within the range allowed by 
statute,22 and (3) a tax on those subject to State income tax but 
not the county tax (the “Special Non-Resident Tax” or “SNRT”) 
at a rate equal to the lowest county tax . . . .23   
Consequently, as individual taxpayers, the Wynnes were subject to both the 
state tax and the county tax.24  Importantly, “a resident may claim a credit 
only against the State income tax for a taxable year in the amount 
determined under Tax General Article § 10-703(c) for State tax on income 
                                                          
 17.  “A subchapter S corporation or ‘S corporation’ is a corporation—often a relatively small 
business—that meets certain requirements set forth in the Internal Revenue Code and makes an 
election to pass through its income and losses, for federal tax purposes, to its shareholders.”  
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 431 Md. 147, 157, 64 A.3d 453, 459 (2013) (citing  
DOUGLAS A. KAHN ET. AL., CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION 220–21 (6th ed. 2009)).  Each 
shareholder reports his or her share of the S corporation’s income and losses on their individual 
tax returns and is assessed federal income tax at the shareholder’s individual rate.  In that way, the 
income that the S corporation generates to its owners is taxed at one level—similar to the taxation 
of a partnership—rather than at two levels (corporate and shareholder) as is otherwise typically 
the case.  To accomplish this, the character of any item of income or loss of an S corporation 
‘passes through’ to its owners ‘as if that item were realized directly from the source from which 
realized by the corporation, or incurred in the same manner as incurred by the corporation.  28 
U.S.C. § 1366(b).  The income of an S corporation [also] “passes through” and is attributed to its 
shareholders for purposes of the Maryland income tax law.  See TG § 10-104(6); see also TG §§ 
10-102.1, 10-304(3);  Wynne, 431 Md. at 157–58, 64 A.3d at 459.   
 18.  Wynne, 431 Md. at 159, 64 A.3d at 459–60.  
 19.  Id. at 158, 64 A.3d at 459.   
 20.  Id. at 159, 64 A.3d at 459–60.   
 21.  Id. at 155, 64 A.3d at 457–8 (footnote omitted) (citing Tax General Article (“TG”) § 10-
105).  
 22.  Id. at 156, 64 A.3d at 458 (citing TG §§ 10-103 and 10-106). 
 23.  Id. (citing TG § 10-106.1).  
 24.  Id. at 156, 64 A.3d at 458.  
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paid to another state for the year.”25  However, Maryland did not offer a 
credit for income taxes paid in other states against the county tax.26 
B.  Procedural Posture 
During the 2006 tax year, the Wynnes claimed their pro rata share of 
Maxim’s income taxes paid to other states as a credit against their 2006 
Maryland individual income tax.27  Subsequently, in 2006, the Maryland 
Comptroller audited the computation of the Wynne’s local tax owed and 
revised the amount credited to the Wynnes for taxes paid to other states.28  
As a result of this review, there was a deficiency in the amount of Maryland 
taxes that the Wynnes paid. Consequently, the Comptroller issued an 
assessment, which the Wynnes subsequently appealed.29  The Hearings and 
Appeals Section of the Maryland Comptroller’s office affirmed the prior 
assessment with slight revisions on October 6, 2008.30 
The Wynnes then filed an appeal to the Maryland Tax Court, where 
they argued that “the limitation of the credit to the State tax for tax 
payments made to other states discriminated against interstate commerce in 
violation of the Commerce Clause.”31  However, on December 29, 2009, 
the Tax Court rejected the Wynne’s contentions and affirmed the 
assessment, upon which the Wynnes sought judicial review.32  In a decision 
issued on June 29, 2011, the Circuit Court for Howard County reversed the 
decision and remanded it to the Tax Court for further development and to 
give the Wynnes a credit for taxes paid to Maryland on out-of-state 
income.33  On July 22, 2011, the Wynnes appealed to the Maryland Court 
of Special Appeals, however, the Maryland Court of Appeals granted 
certiorari prior to the hearing and decision in the intermediate appellate 
court.34 
                                                          
 25.  Id. (quoting TG § 10-703(a)). 
 26.  Id. at 157, 64 A.3d at 458 (citing TG § 10-703(a)).  
 27.  Id. at 159, 64 A.3d at 460. 
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id.  The Comptroller determined that the Wynnes used the local tax rate for Carroll 
County rather than Howard County in error.  The “hearing officer upheld the Comptroller’s 
revised computation, a decision that the Tax Court affirmed.  The Wynnes did not further appeal 
that issue.”  Id. at n.12, 64 A.3d at 460. 
 31.  Id. at 159–60, 64 A.3d at 460. 
 32.  Id. at 160, 64 A.3d at 460.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id.  
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C.  Appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals 
On appeal to the Maryland Court of Appeals, the Wynnes reprised 
their argument from the Tax Court.35  In response, the Comptroller argued 
that the county portion of the state income tax scheme is not intended to 
impact interstate commerce and that the Wynnes failed to allege such an 
impact resulting from the State’s failure to grant a credit for taxes paid to 
other states.36  The court answered the Comptroller’s assertion, stating that 
the dormant Commerce Clause applies more widely than solely when 
physical goods move across state lines.37  In fact, the court argued, a tax is 
subject to scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause when it 
“substantially affects interstate commerce.”38 
The court then turned to the question of whether the application of the 
county tax without a credit violates the dormant Commerce Clause.39  The 
court determined that a state tax survives a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge under the Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady40 test if it: “1) 
applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state; 2) is 
fairly apportioned; 3) is not discriminatory towards interstate or foreign 
commerce; and 4) is fairly related to the services provided by the state.”41  
Because the Wynnes did not dispute the first or fourth prongs of the 
Complete Auto test, the court focused on the requirement of fair 
apportionment and the prohibition of discrimination against interstate 
commerce.42 
In order to assess the fairness of apportionment of the Maryland 
county tax, the court looked to whether the tax was “internally consistent” 
as well as “externally consistent.”43  In order to measure internal 
consistency, the court answered the following hypothetical question: “If 
each state imposed a county tax without a credit in the context of a tax 
scheme identical to that of Maryland, would interstate commerce be 
disadvantaged compared to intrastate commerce?”44  According to the 
court, “the answer is yes” because Maryland taxpayers who earn income 
                                                          
 35.  Id. at 161, 64 A.3d at 461.  The Wynnes again alleged that “the limitation of the credit to 
the State tax for tax payments made to other states discriminated against commerce in violation of 
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.”  Id. at 160, 64 A.3d at 460.  
 36.  Id. at 162, 64 A.3d at 462.  
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id. at 163, 64 A.3d at 462.  
 39.  Id. at 165, 64 A.3d at 463. 
 40.  430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 41.  Wynne, 431 Md. at 165, 64 A.3d at 463 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 
U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).  
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id. at 166, 64 A.3d at 464 (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 
185 (1995)).  
 44.  Id. at 166–67, 64 A.3d at 464. 
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outside of Maryland would be taxed at higher rates than Maryland 
taxpayers who earn income entirely in Maryland.45 
In order to measure the external consistency of the county tax, the 
court assessed “whether the State has taxed only that portion of the 
revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state 
component of the activity being taxed.”46  The court concluded that because 
Maryland does not give a credit towards the county tax for income earned 
and taxed out of state, Maryland may tax income doubly, giving further 
indication that the application of the county tax in these circumstances 
violates the dormant Commerce Clause.47 
Finally, the court assessed whether the county tax discriminated 
against interstate commerce under the third prong of the Complete Auto 
test.48  The court likened Maryland’s county tax to other taxes that the 
Supreme Court found to be discriminatory in Fulton v. Faulkner49 and 
Haliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily50 while distinguishing it from a non-
discriminatory statute in Amerada Hess v. New Jersey Dept. of the 
Treasury.51  The court held that “the failure of the Maryland income tax law 
to allow a credit against the county tax for a Maryland resident taxpayer 
with respect to pass-through income of an S corporation that arises from 
activities in another state and that is taxed in that state violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution.”52  The Maryland Court of 
Appeals remanded the case to the Tax Court with instructions to recalculate 
the Wynnes’ tax liability.53  The Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland 
filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari with the United States Supreme 
Court on October 13, 2013.54  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
May 27, 2014 in order to determine whether Maryland’s decision not to 
grant its taxpayers a credit against the Maryland county tax for taxes paid 
on income earned out of state violated the dormant Commerce Clause.55 
                                                          
 45.  Id. at 167, 64 A.3d at 464. 
 46.  Id. at 171, 64 A.3d at 467 (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 262 (1989)).  
 47.  Id. at 172, 64 A.3d at 467–68. 
 48.  Id. at 173, 64 A.3d at 468. 
 49.  516 U.S. 325, 333 n.3 (1996) (holding the “North Carolina property tax on intangibles 
that taxed investments in out-of-state businesses at a higher rate violated the Commerce Clause”).  
 50.  373 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1963) (holding that a “Louisiana state had the discriminatory effect 
of imposing a greater tax on goods manufactured outside Louisiana than on goods manufactured 
within that state, thereby creating an incentive to locate the manufacturing process within 
Louisiana”).  
 51.  490 U.S. 66, 78–79 n.10 (holding that “a state tax may not discriminate against a 
transaction because the transaction has an interstate element or because the transaction or incident 
crosses state lines”).   
 52.  Wynne, 431 Md. at 176–77, 64 A.3d at 470.   
 53.  Id. at 178, 64 A.3d at 471. 
 54.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 
(2015) (No. 13-485). 
 55.  Id. 
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The United States Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence regarding state taxation demonstrates a long-standing tension 
between those intent on using the dormant Commerce Clause to prevent 
economic isolation amongst the states and those who value the autonomy of 
the states and the political processes over political objectives.  Part II.A of 
this Note discusses the development of the strand of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that favors an active use of the dormant Commerce Clause in 
order to invalidate state tax schemes that present the possible burden of 
double taxation.  Part II.B of this Note addresses the development of the 
competing strand of Supreme Court jurisprudence that values the 
sovereignty of the states to tax its residents’ income over an active use of 
the dormant Commerce Clause. 
The United States Constitution authorizes the federal government to 
“regulate commerce . . . among the several states.”56  However, this 
statement has long been held to include a “further, negative command, 
known as the dormant Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain state taxation 
even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.”57  Since the 
initial recognition of the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has 
considered multiple challenges to state tax schemes alleged to be 
discriminatory to interstate commerce.58  These cases have developed 
starkly contrasting views within the Court regarding its role in using the 
dormant Commerce Clause to strike down state tax schemes.  This 
dichotomy is the result of competing values evident in the two strands of 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence regarding state taxation.  When a 
state tax-related Commerce Clause case comes to the Supreme Court, the 
winning line of cases typically has been determined simply by the swing of 
votes on the Court.  There is no particular observable pattern creating 
“periods” of the Court as one might find in other areas of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. 
                                                          
 56.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.  
 57.  Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995). 
 58.  See J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 308 (1938) (deciding “whether the 
Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933 as construed and applied burden interstate commerce”); 
see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274 (1977) (deciding whether 
“Mississippi runs afoul of the Commerce Clause, when it applies the tax it imposes on ‘the 
privilege of . . . doing business’ within the State to appellant’s activity in interstate commerce”); 
Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 660 (1948) (deciding whether New York 
may “[claim] the right to tax the gross receipts from transportation which traverses New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania as well as New York” under the commerce clause of the federal constitution); 
Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 435 (1939) (deciding “whether a 
Washington tax measured by the gross receipts of appellant from its business of marketing fruit 
shipped from Washington to the places of sale in various states and in foreign countries is a 
burden on interstate and foreign commerce prohibited by the commerce clause of the federal 
constitution”).  
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The Wynne majority strand of jurisprudence is more likely to strike 
down state taxes as discriminatory against interstate commerce.  It believes 
that the dormant Commerce Clause is meant to prevent economic 
Balkanization actuated by unfair double taxation amongst the states.59  The 
other strand of jurisprudence, evidenced by the principal dissent in Wynne, 
takes a more limited view.  It argues that the dormant Commerce Clause 
may not interfere with the State’s right to tax its residents’ income.60  The 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the constitutionality of state tax schemes 
under the dormant Commerce Clause has vacillated between these 
competing principles without reconciling them. 
A.  The Wynne Majority Strand of Supreme Court Jurisprudence Used 
the Dormant Commerce Clause to Invalidate State Taxes That 
Create a Burden of Multiple Taxation 
A significant group of Supreme Court cases that have struck down 
state tax schemes under the Commerce Clause have utilized the premise 
that a state may not “impose a tax which discriminates against interstate 
commerce . . . by subjecting [it] to the burden of ‘multiple taxation.’”61  The 
Court’s resistance to double taxation originated in the late 1930s and 1940s 
with three cases, J.D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,62 Gwin, White & 
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford,63 and Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey,64 
in which the Court struck down state tax schemes that could have created 
multiple, or “double” taxation systems that directly burdened out-of-state 
interests in favor of in-state interests.65 
These cases discarded the Supreme Court’s previous distinction 
between gross-receipt and net-income taxes.66  These cases also reflect the 
Wynne majority strand of jurisprudence’s insistence that “the generality and 
nondiscriminatory character of the exaction” of a tax “will not save the tax 
if it directly burdens interstate commerce.”67  In 1977, this strand further 
solidified its commitment to striking down state tax schemes that might 
burden interstate commerce in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady.68  The 
Brady Court found that, in order to strike down a state tax law under the 
                                                          
 59.  Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979). 
 60.  Okla. Tax. Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462–63 (1995).   
 61.  Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).  
 62.  304 U.S. 307 (1938).  
 63.  305 U.S. 434 (1939).  
 64.  334 U.S. 653 (1948).  
 65.  See supra note 58.   
 66.  U.S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 326–29  (1918).  The Supreme Court found 
that a gross receipts tax creates a “[direct] burden on interstate commerce” whereas a net-income 
tax “only indirectly affects the profits or returns from such commerce.”  Id. at 326. 
 67.  J.D. Adams Mfg. Co., 304 U.S. at 312.  
 68.  Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).  
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dormant Commerce Clause, there must be “a showing of discrimination 
against interstate commerce.”69  Notably, the Complete Auto test also gave 
rise to the internal consistency test.  The Wynne majority strand of 
jurisprudence has since used the Complete Auto test, along with other 
means, to strike down state tax schemes under the dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
1.  The Complete Auto Test and the Rise of the Internal and 
External Consistency Tests  
The Supreme Court codified a test for determining the constitutionality 
of state taxes under the Commerce Clause in Complete Auto.70  Under this 
test the Court should sustain a tax against a “Commerce Clause challenge 
when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the 
taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the state.”71  The 
Complete Auto test has subsequently been applied in multiple cases 
challenging state laws under the Commerce Clause.72  When utilizing the 
Complete Auto test in determining the constitutionality of a state tax 
scheme, the Court has typically required that each prong be satisfied 
explicitly, creating a factor test rather than a balancing test.73 
In determining whether a tax is fairly apportioned under Complete 
Auto, the Court uses the internal consistency test in which the Court “looks 
to the structure of the tax at issue to see whether its identical application by 
every state in the Union would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage 
as compared with commerce intrastate.”74  The internal consistency test was 
first introduced in 1983 in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax 
Board.75 This test, originally used to apportion the income of a unitary 
                                                          
 69.  Id. at 280. 
 70.  Id. at 279. 
 71.  Id.  
 72. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 310–11 (1994) (finding that 
“a state tax on foreign commerce will not survive Commerce clause scrutiny if the taxpayer 
demonstrates that the tax” fails the Complete Auto test); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 
514 U.S. 175, 183 (1995) (applying the “criteria” of the Complete Auto test to the tax before the 
Court); Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 372 (1991) (applying Complete 
Auto’s “four part test”). 
 73.  See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 257 (1989) (finding that an Illinois tax does not 
violate the Commerce Clause if it satisfies all four prongs of the Complete Auto test); Jefferson 
Lines, 514 U.S at 183 (applying “Complete Auto’s four-part test”); D.H. Holmes Co. v. 
McNamera, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988) (finding that the application of a Louisiana tax “does not 
violate the Commerce Clause if the tax complies with the four prongs of Complete Auto”); 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mont., 453 U.S. 609, 614 (1981) (finding that the Montana tax in 
question must be “scrutinized under the Complete Auto test”).  
 74.  Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185. 
 75.  463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).   
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business within and without a state,76 has been used as part of the Complete 
Auto test multiple times since its inception in order to strike down state tax 
schemes deemed discriminatory against interstate commerce.77  For 
instance, in Tyler Pipe Industries v. Washington State Department of 
Revenue,78 the Court applied the internal consistency test in order to strike 
down a facially discriminatory Washington State tax that “exposes 
manufacturing or selling activity outside the State to a multiple [sic] burden 
from which only the activity of manufacturing in-state and selling in-state is 
exempt.”79  However, the fair apportionment prong of the Complete Auto 
test looks not only to the internal consistency of the tax scheme, but also to 
its external consistency.80  In assessing the external consistency of a state 
tax scheme, the Court looks to the “economic justification for the State’s 
claim upon the value taxed, to discover whether a State’s tax reaches 
beyond that portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity 
within the taxing state.”81  The external consistency test is often thought of 
as the “more difficult requirement” of the two.82 
2.  The Wynne Majority Strand of Jurisprudence Has Also Used 
Other Means to Invalidate State Tax Schemes 
The United States Supreme Court, in favor of an active use of the 
dormant Commerce Clause, has utilized tools beyond the Complete Auto 
test in order to strike down state tax schemes that create the potential for 
double taxation.  First, the Court has analogized such state taxes to tariffs, 
which it considers “the paradigmatic example of a law discriminating 
against interstate commerce.”83  While states have avoided imposing direct 
tariffs on other states, the Court has carefully monitored and struck down 
                                                          
 76.  Id. (“Having determined that a certain set of activities constitute a ‘unitary business,’ a 
State must then apply a formula apportioning the income of that business within and without the 
States.  Such an apportionment formula must, under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, be 
fair.  The first . . . component of fairness in an apportionment formula is what might be called 
internal consistency . . . .”). 
 77.  See Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984) (applying the internal consistency 
test “where the allegation is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate commerce”); Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 284–85 (1987) (applying the internal consistency test 
to a challenge of a Pennsylvania flat tax under the Commerce Clause); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. 
State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 240 (1987) (noting that “a tax must have ‘what might be 
called internal consistency’”); Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1803 
(2015) (applying the internal consistency test to a Maryland state tax scheme).  
 78.  483 U.S. 232 (1987). 
 79.  Id. at 248. 
 80.  Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995).  
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). 
 83.  W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994).   
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state schemes attempting to impose tariffs by less direct means.84  For 
instance in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,85 the Supreme Court invalidated 
a Hawaii state law that authorized a functional tariff granting a tax 
exemption to in-state producers of certain liquors in order to create an 
advantage for local production.86  In doing so, the Court reasoned that 
“states may not ‘build up [their] domestic commerce by means of unequal 
and oppressive burden upon the industry and business of other States.’”87 
On multiple occasions, the members of the Court in favor of an active 
use of the dormant Commerce Clause have asserted their right to strike 
down laws despite the fact that the laws are not facially discriminatory.88   
Many instances of double taxation are facially discriminatory.  For instance, 
a state income tax on a resident’s out-of-state income at ten percent and on 
their in-state income at five percent is facially discriminatory.  However, 
this wing of the Court goes beyond striking down only facially 
discriminatory tax schemes.  As the Tyler Pipe Court reasoned, “the fact 
that [a] tax ‘has the advantage of appearing nondiscriminatory,’ does not 
save it from invalidation.”89 
B.  A Competing Strand of Supreme Court Jurisprudence  
The other wing of the Supreme Court looks to uphold potentially 
discriminatory state tax laws based on their belief in the “well established 
principles of interstate and international taxation . . . that a jurisdiction . . . 
may tax all the income of its residents, even income earned outside the 
taxing jurisdiction.”90  Such deference to a state’s sovereignty was 
substantiated by a number of cases in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in 
which the Court upheld a state’s ability to tax the income of its residents, 
regardless of where residents earned it, on both Commerce Clause and other 
constitutional grounds.91 
                                                          
 84.  Id. at 193–94.  See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 528 (1935) (striking 
down a New York law that set up a system of minimum prices to be paid by dealers to producers). 
 85.  468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
 86.  Id. at 265.  
 87.  Id. at 273 (quoting Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880)).  
 88.  See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 248 (1987) 
(overruling GMC v. Washington, 337 U.S. 436 (1964), in which the Court found that a tax 
appearing non-discriminatory saved it from invalidation); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 
(1986) (finding that a state law can “discriminate against interstate commerce ‘either on its face or 
in practical effect’” (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979))).  
 89.  Tyler Pipe, 483 U.S. at 248 (quoting G.M.C. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 460 (1964) 
(Goldberg, J., dissenting)).   
 90.  Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462–63 (1995).  
 91.  See Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920) (upholding a tax on payments received from a 
trust located in a different state); see also State Tax Comm’n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942) 
(finding that a state can impose a tax upon a transfer by death of shares of a corporation despite 
the fact that the decedent was domiciled in another state); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 373 
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Proponents of this strand of cases argue that the State’s ability to tax 
its residents’ income within and outside its borders is a “well established 
principle” of interstate taxation, and thus, state sovereignty.92  The 
responsibility of a state’s residents to share in the burden of taxes on 
income earned interstate results from resident’s “enjoyment of the 
privileges of residence within [a] state, and the attendant right to invoke the 
protection of its laws.”93 
1.  The Wynne Dissent Strand of Jurisprudence  
In order to defend against the Court’s overreach into questions 
pertaining to state sovereign decisions, this wing of the Supreme Court 
believes that “it is not a purpose of the Commerce Clause to protect state 
residents from their own state taxes.”94  Rather than using the dormant 
Commerce Clause to strike down such a state tax, this wing of the Court has 
espoused its belief that the existence of in-state interests negatively affected 
by a state tax are sufficient either to legitimize the scheme or require use of 
the political processes to end the system.95 As Justice Marshall stated, 
“security against the abuse of [the taxing] power, is found in the structure of 
the government itself.  In imposing a tax the legislature acts upon its 
constituents.  This is in general a sufficient security against erroneous and 
oppressive taxation.”96 
The Court has applied its reluctance to interfere in taxation schemes to 
state regimes as well,  arguing that state legislatures are best equipped to 
make significant changes to established tax schemes.97  Adhering to this 
view, the Justices have argued that not only should state taxation be 
relatively free from federal interference but also free from the interference 
of other states’ taxation decisions.  In fact, the proponents argue “the right 
of the several states to exercise the widest liberty with respect to the 
imposition of internal taxes has always been recognized by this Court.”98  
                                                          
(1939) (declining “to press to a logical extreme the doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment may 
be invoked to compel the taxation of intangibles by only a single sate by attributing to them a situs 
within that state”); Guar. Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938) (finding that “the mere fact 
that another state lawfully taxed funds from which the payments were made did not necessarily 
destroy Virginia’s right to tax something done within her borders”).  
 92.  Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 462.  
 93.  Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1932). 
 94.  Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989).  
 95.  W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994) (“The existence of major in-state 
interests adversely affected . . . is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse.” (quoting 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 473, n.17 (1981))).   
 96.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 428 (1819).  
 97.  Paddell v. New York, 211 U.S. 446, 448 (1908) (“The fact that the system [of taxation] 
has been in force for a very long time is of itself a very strong reason . . . for leaving any 
improvement that may be desired to the legislature.”).  
 98.  Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 51 (1920). 
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This wing of the Court prefers to defer to states’ decisions regarding 
whether to offer a credit for income taxes paid to other states, rather than 
preempting such state sovereignty by invalidating the tax under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.99 
2.  The Wynne Dissent Wing and the Loose Application of the 
Internal Consistency Test to State Tax Regimes 
Although the internal consistency test has been strictly applied in some 
state taxation cases, the Wynne dissenting wing of the Court upheld a state 
tax scheme despite it admittedly appearing internally inconsistent.100  For 
instance, in American Trucking Associations Inc. v. Michigan Public 
Service Commission, the Supreme Court upheld a Michigan fee on 
Michigan trucks under the Commerce Clause although the fee concededly 
appeared to fail the internal consistency test.101 However, the Court noted 
that the internal consistency test is “typically used where taxation of 
interstate transactions is at issue.”102  The Court found that the tax 
“focuse[d] on local activity” and was “assessed even handedly” despite the 
fact that the application of the tax in all other states would force trucks 
traveling in interstate commerce to “pay fees totaling several hundred 
dollars.”103  Relying on the “principles and precedents” of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, the American Trucking Court decided that there was 
nothing “suggesting that Michigan’s fee operates in practice as anything 
other than an unobjectionable exercise of the State’s police power.”104 
Crucially, the Court stressed that such “neutral, locally focused” fees and 
taxes are consistent with the Commerce Clause.105 
                                                          
 99.  Okla. Tax Comm’n v Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 463 n.12 (1995) (“Although 
sovereigns have authority to tax all income of their residents, including income earned outside 
their borders, they sometimes elect not to do so, and they commonly credit income taxes paid to 
other sovereigns.  But ‘if foreign income of a domiciliary taxpayer is exempted, this is an 
independent policy decision and not one compelled by jurisdictional considerations.’” (quoting 
Federal Income Tax Project: International Aspects of United States Income Taxation, A.L.I. 6 
(1987))). 
 100.  See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. Pub. Ser. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 438 (2005) 
(upholding a state tax that appeared on its face to be internally inconsistent).   
 101.  Id.   
 102.  Id. at 437. 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. at 434. 
 105.  Id.  
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III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
A.  Justice Alito’s Majority Opinion 
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne,106 the United States Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, holding that 
the Court “has long held that States cannot subject corporate income to tax 
schemes similar to Maryland’s and we see no reason why income earned by 
individuals should be treated less favorably.”107  Thus, the county tax aspect 
of Maryland’s tax scheme violated the U.S. Constitution.108 
Justice Alito, writing for the majority,109 began by addressing three 
cases: J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen,110 Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. 
Henneford,111 and Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey.112  In these 
cases the Supreme Court struck down state tax schemes that opened up the 
possibility for the double taxation of income earned out of state and that 
discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of in-state commerce.  
Upon its review, the Court found Maryland’s tax scheme similarly 
unconstitutional.113  Although the principal dissent distinguished the 
aforementioned cases because they focused on a gross receipts tax rather 
than on net income, the majority found no reason why such a distinction 
should matter, given the fact that the Court must consider the “practical 
effect” of a tax statute rather than its “formal language.”114 
The Comptroller argued that J.D. Adams, Gwin, and Central 
Greyhound were distinguishable because they involved the taxation of 
corporations, rather than individuals.115  The Comptroller claimed that tax 
schemes should treat individuals differently than they treat corporations 
because individuals receive services from the states and because residents 
                                                          
 106.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
 107.  Id. at 1792. 
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id. at 1792–1808.  Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices 
Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer and Sotomayor joined.  Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Justice Thomas joined as to Parts I and II.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Justice Scalia joined, except as to the first paragraph.  Justice Ginsburg filed the principal 
dissenting opinion in which Justice Scalia and Justice Kagan joined.   
 110.  304 U.S. 307 (1938) (holding that Indiana violated the dormant Commerce Clause in 
taxing all residents and non-residents who derive income from Indiana). 
 111.  305 U.S. 434, 439 (1939) (holding that a Washington State tax on income on a 
Washington corporation earned exporting goods to other states “discriminates against interstate 
commerce, since it imposes upon it . . . the risk of a multiple burden to which local commerce is 
not exposed”).   
 112.  334 U.S. 653, 662 (1948) (holding that a New York tax on a New York bus company’s 
gross receipts derived from out-of-state business violated the dormant Commerce Clause because 
it imposed an “unfair burden” on interstate commerce).  
 113.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795. 
 114.  Id. (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)). 
 115.  Id. at 1797. 
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of the state have a say in the political process and thus can vote to change 
Maryland’s tax laws.116  The majority countered by arguing that the 
dormant Commerce Clause provides the same protections to corporations 
and individuals because both enjoy state services and that a tax is 
discriminatory to interstate commerce regardless of whether or not the 
person being taxed by a state is a resident of that state.117  The Court 
concluded that it would be “particularly incongruous in the present case to 
disregard our prior decisions regarding the taxation of corporate income 
because the income at issue here is a type of corporate income.”118 
Next, the Court responded to the principal dissent’s claim that the 
“Commerce Clause imposes no limit on Maryland’s ability to tax the 
income of its residents, no matter where that income is earned.”119  The 
Court reasoned that Maryland’s tax scheme violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause despite its ability to tax its residents’ income earned out 
of state because the results of such a tax scheme would be “untenable.”120 
After distinguishing two cases upon which the principal dissent relies, 
Shaffer v. Carter121 and West Publishing Co. v. McColgan,122 the Court 
went on to apply and discuss the internal consistency test.  The Court used 
the internal consistency test to determine which state tax schemes 
discriminated against interstate commerce by looking “to the structure of 
the tax at issue to see whether its identical application by every State in the 
Union would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with 
commerce intrastate.”123  The Court concluded that Maryland’s tax scheme 
failed the internal consistency test because the tax scheme is inherently 
                                                          
 116.  Id.  
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Id. at 1798. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 1799. 
 121.  252 U.S. 37 (1920).  The Court distinguishes Shaffer from the facts sub judice because 
the Court “did not adjudicate anything like the double taxation argument that was accepted in later 
cases and is before us today.”  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1800. 
 122.  328 U.S. 823 (1946).  The Court found that the dissent’s citation to West Publishing 
holds little precedential value because it is a summary affirmance, which “is not to be read as a 
renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.” 
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1800–01 (quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)). 
 123.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802 (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 
185 (1995)).  The Court justified its use of the internal consistency test, stating: 
[B]y hypothetically assuming that every State has the same tax structure, the internal 
consistency test allows courts to isolate the effect of a defendant State’s tax scheme.  
This is a virtue of the test because it allows courts to distinguish between (1) tax 
schemes that inherently discriminate against interstate commerce without regard to the 
tax policies of other States, and (2) tax schemes that create disparate incentives to 
engage in interstate commerce (and sometimes result in double taxation) only as a 
result of the interaction of two different but nondiscriminatory and internally consistent 
schemes. 
Id.  
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discriminatory to interstate commerce and functions as a tariff.124  Despite 
this conclusion, a state like Maryland that taxes interstate commerce at a 
higher rate than it does intrastate commerce could still cure such an 
indiscretion by “lowering the high rate, raising the lower rate, or a 
combination of the two.”125 
Finally, the Court countered the assertions of both Justice Scalia and 
Justice Thomas, voiced in separate dissents, that the dormant Commerce 
Clause is “a judicial fraud.”126  The Court did so by espousing the history of 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, arguing that this doctrine has 
been applied numerous times by numerous justices.127 
B.  Justice Ginsburg’s Principal Dissent 
In the principal dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that “nothing in the 
Constitution or in prior decisions of this Court dictates that one of two 
States, the domiciliary State or the source State, must recede simply 
because both have lawful tax regimes reaching the same income.”128  
Justice Ginsburg first reasoned that because the residents of a state take 
advantage of expensive services provided by that state, the Court should not 
fault the state for obligating its residents to pay taxes on income earned out 
of state, regardless of what tax obligations a person has to other states.129  
Justice Ginsburg further claimed that the Commerce Clause need not 
protect residents of a state from their own state’s taxes in this case because 
residents of Maryland possess the ability to prevent abuse of state power to 
tax via utilization of state political processes.130 
In advocating for the constitutionality of Maryland’s county tax, 
Justice Ginsburg asserted that “a taxpayer living in one state and working in 
another gains protection and benefits from both—and so can be called upon 
to share in the costs of both States’ governments.”131  Rather than a 
constitutional question, the principal dissent insists that the Court made a 
policy choice between “legitimate but competing tax policy objectives.”132  
Justice Ginsburg stressed that it has long been the responsibility of the 
states and Congress to strike a balance between competing policy 
objectives.133  She argued that the question facing the Court is, in fact, a 
                                                          
 124.  Id. at 1804.  
 125.  Id. at 1806. 
 126.  Id. (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 1813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 129.  Id. at 1814. 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id. at 1816. 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id.  The principal dissent argues that states making this policy choice “might prioritize 
obtaining equal contributions from those who benefit from the State’s protection in roughly 
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matter of tax policy that “state legislatures and the Congress are 
constitutionally assigned and institutionally better equipped to balance.”134  
The principal dissent also established historical precedent for Maryland’s 
tax scheme, emphasizing that “since almost the dawn of the modern era of 
state income taxations, other states have taken the same approach as 
Maryland does now.”135 
Justice Ginsburg went on to criticize the Court’s application of the 
internal consistency test, arguing that the Court had not applied the internal 
consistency test to a tax under review for two decades.136  Further, the 
principal dissent argued against the Court’s position that “Maryland’s tax 
scheme is internally inconsistent because Maryland simultaneously imposes 
two taxes: the county income tax and the special nonresident tax.”137  Yet, 
the Wynnes are only liable for the county tax.138  Justice Ginsburg reasoned 
that “because it is the interaction between [the county tax and the special 
nonresident tax] that renders Maryland’s tax scheme internally inconsistent, 
Maryland could eliminate the inconsistency by terminating the special 
nonresident tax—a measure that would not help the Wynnes at all.”139 
C.  Justices Scalia and Thomas’s Dissents 
Justice Scalia dissented separately in order to note his belief that there 
is not a dormant Commerce Clause in the Constitution and that the internal 
consistency test is not derived from the text or structure of the 
Constitution.140  Justice Scalia also argued that that the dormant Commerce 
Clause is “[incompatible] with the judicial role” because it requires the 
Court “to balance the needs of commerce against the needs of state 
governments” which is “a task for legislators, not judges.”141  In arguing 
that Maryland’s tax scheme should be upheld, Justice Scalia concluded that 
“nothing in the Constitution precludes Maryland from deciding that the 
benefits of its tax scheme are worth the costs.”142 
Justice Thomas also wrote separately in dissent, reprising his 
consistent view that “the negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text 
                                                          
similar ways.  Or a State might prioritize ensuring that its taxpayers are not subject to double 
taxation.  A State cannot, however, accomplish both objectives at once.”  Id.   
 134.  Id. at 1823.  
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 1820. 
 137.  Id. at 1822. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. (“Maryland could, in other words, bring itself into compliance with the test at the 
heart of the Court’s analysis without removing the double tax burden the test is purportedly 
designed to ‘cure.’”).   
 140.  Id. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 141.  Id. at 1810.  
 142.  Id. at 1811. 
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of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable 
in application, and consequently, cannot serve as a basis for striking down a 
state statute.”143  Justice Thomas argued that the Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has greatly “departed from the actual 
conception of the Commerce Clause” in finding that Maryland’s tax scheme 
should be upheld.144 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne,145 the United States Supreme 
Court held that Maryland’s failure to offer its residents a credit for taxes 
paid to other states caused its county tax to violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.146  In deciding the constitutionality of Maryland’s state tax scheme 
under the dormant Commerce Clause, the majority opinion, authored by 
Justice Alito, afforded the internal consistency test undue deference by 
applying it strictly.147  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, on the other hand, 
correctly argued that the State should be able to tax all of its residents’ 
income regardless of the internal consistency of the tax.148  The two 
opinions, both supported by significant Supreme Court jurisprudence, did 
nothing to relieve the historical contention between these two competing 
strands of jurisprudence.149 
Here, the Wynne Court, including both the majority and the principal 
dissent, erred by failing to compromise.  Rather than reprising the opinions 
of their long-standing strands of jurisprudence that have created 
inconsistent results, the Court should have incorporated some of the 
principles of each strand of jurisprudence in order to create a Bridge Test, 
as devised below.150  Although the rise of the Complete Auto test and the 
internal consistency test allow the Wynne majority to defeat Maryland’s tax 
scheme, the legitimate principles, developed through significant Supreme 
Court precedent, and upon which the Wynne dissent relies, were not 
adequately reconciled and not applied to Commerce Clause cases as often 
                                                          
 143.  Id. at 1811 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1721 
(2013) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 144. Id. 
 145.  135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
 146.  Id.  
 147.  Id. at 1803.  
 148.  Id. at 1821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 149.  See supra Part III.A–B. 
 150.  It is true that even a new test incorporating aspects of both strands of jurisprudence likely 
would not have received the support of all nine Supreme Court justices.  Both the majority and the 
principal dissent acknowledge the existence of the dormant Commerce Clause and have 
incorporated it into their judicial decisionmaking on issues of state taxation.  In their dissents, 
Justices Scalia and Thomas both deny the existence of the dormant Commerce Clause and thus, 
would likely decline to subscribe to any new test that the Court or this Note might propose.  
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as those of the Wynne majority strand of jurisprudence, the principles 
adopted by the Wynne dissent strand of jurisprudence are far-reaching and 
can be legitimately applied in conjunction with those of the Wynne 
majority.  In many respects, Wynne presents the perfect fact pattern with 
which to bridge the gap and end the competition between them.   
The Court has had ample time to recognize both that their respective 
principles can be reconciled, and the necessity for creating a unifying test 
with criteria that allow for more consistent decisions going forward.  
Instead of doing so, the Wynne majority and principal dissent respectively 
decided to stand on its preferred principles, eschewing the opportunity to 
create a compromise that would lead to consistent results.  Part IV.A. of this 
Note introduces a new test for deciding issues of state taxation under the 
Commerce Clause.  Part IV.B. discusses the ways in which this new test 
incorporates the fundamental principles of both strands of jurisprudence in 
order to bridge the gap between them.  Finally, Part IV.C. discusses the 
various ways in which this new test incorporates aspects of each wing of the 
Court’s past decisions in order to create a compromise that produces 
consistent and replicable results. 
A.  The “Bridge Test”: Bridging the Gap Between the Competing 
Strands of State Tax-Related Commerce Clause Jurisprudence 
In order to resolve the long-standing dormant Commerce Clause 
conflict between two strands of jurisprudence, the Court should have 
created a test that incorporates significant aspects of both strands.  The 
“Bridge Test” proposed in this Note, in contrast, creates a consistent and 
unifying method for deciding issues of state taxation under the Commerce 
Clause. 
Importantly, the Bridge Test adopts the principle espoused in 
American Trucking Associations Inc. v. Michigan Public Service 
Commission, in which the Court upheld a Michigan state tax that appeared 
to be internally inconsistent.151  In American Trucking II, the Court was 
“obviously uncomfortable with [the] implications” of a strict application of 
the internal consistency test and decided to apply it leniently.152  The 
implications of the Wynne Court’s strict use of the internal consistency test 
are equally troubling,153 so the Bridge Test adopts a similarly lenient 
application. 
                                                          
 151.  Am. Trucking Ass’ns. Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 438 (2005).  This 
case is commonly referred to as “American Trucking II.” 
 152.  Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency” Dead?: Reflections on an Evolving 
Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 61 TAX L. REV. 1, 26 (2007).  A “strict 
application” of the internal consistency test is one in which a failure causes the tax to be deemed 
unconstitutional.  A “lenient application” of the internal consistency test is one in which a failure 
can be overcoming based on the satisfaction of other decisive factors.  
 153.  See text accompanying supra notes 3–16.   
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The Bridge Test is designed to replace the Complete Auto test that has 
failed to resolve the division between competing strands of 
jurisprudence.154  In utilizing the Bridge Test, the Court should first 
consider whether the state’s tax scheme passes the internal consistency test.  
If the tax scheme is internally consistent, it is constitutional under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  If it is not internally consistent, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the tax scheme is unconstitutional.  However, a 
state’s tax scheme can overcome such a presumption of unconstitutionality 
if it passes the following factor test:155 (1) the tax is not facially 
discriminatory towards out-of-state interests; (2) the interests most directly 
burdened by the tax have a remedy in the political process; and (3) the tax is 
externally consistent.  In applying the Bridge Test to the facts in Wynne, the 
Maryland tax scheme is constitutional. 
B.  The Bridge Test Unites Two Competing Strands of Jurisprudence by 
Incorporating the Fundamental Principles That Each Wing of the 
Court Values 
The majority and principal dissenting opinions in Wynne represent two 
individual and long-standing strands of Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
constitutional taxation issues.  Justice Alito’s majority opinion advocates 
for an active use of the dormant Commerce Clause and the internal 
consistency test in striking down instances in which a state’s tax scheme 
might create the possibility of double taxation.156  Justice Ginsburg’s 
principal dissenting opinion relies on the “‘well established principle of 
interstate and international taxation’ that ‘sovereigns have authority to tax 
all income of their residents, including income earned outside their 
borders.’”157 
Although these strands of jurisprudence are well supported by 
precedent in their own right, they have not been reconciled.  Importantly, 
                                                          
 154.  See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.  
 155.  The author has titled this test the “Bridge Test.” 
 156.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1803 (2015) (“Nor may a State 
impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce either by providing a direct 
commercial advantage to local business, or by subjecting interstate commerce to the burden of 
‘multiple taxation.’” (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 
(1959))).  Justice Alito stated that the Court should utilize the internal consistency test to “identify 
tax schemes that [discriminate] against interstate commerce” and cites instances in which the 
Court has used it.  Id. at 1803; see also Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 
U.S. 232, 247 (1987) (noting that “a tax must have ‘what might be called internal consistency’”); 
Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984) (applying the internal consistency test “where 
the allegation is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate commerce”); Container Corp. 
of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983) (applying the internal consistency test in 
order to apportion income of a business “within and without the State”).   
 157.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. 
Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 470, n.12 (1995)).  
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each strand of jurisprudence has utilized the principles central to their idea 
of appropriate state taxation in order to rule on instances of potential double 
taxation.   For instance, the majority relies upon JD Adams, Gwin, and 
Central Greyhound,158 in which the Court “struck down a state tax scheme 
that might have resulted in the double taxation of income earned out of the 
State and that discriminated in favor of intrastate over interstate economic 
activity” on both Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause grounds.159 
On the other hand, the Wynne dissent emphasizes the ruling in Shaffer 
v. Carter,160 in which the Court upheld “a tax on a nonresident’s in-state 
income” that “exposed taxpayers to the . . . risk of double taxation.”161  In 
Shaffer, the Wynne dissent wing of the Court relies on its fundamental 
principle of respect for the sovereignty of the states to tax their residents’ 
income and resolves the case on Due Process Clause grounds, avoiding the 
Commerce Clause entirely.162  The Shaffer Court refers to its “fundamental 
principles” in asserting that states have “complete dominion over all 
persons, property, and business transactions within their borders . . . [States] 
have the power normally pertaining to governments to resort to all 
reasonable forms of taxation in order to defray the governmental 
expenses.”163 
The majority and principle dissent in Wynne clarify their respective 
strands of jurisprudence but make no effort to bridge the gap between them.  
Consequently, the Bridge Test proposed in this Note incorporates the 
fundamental principles of both strands of jurisprudence as well as the legal 
values that they each hold in order to create a manageable and consistent 
method for deciding issues of state taxation in the future.  Part IV.B.1–2 of 
this Note discusses how the Bridge Test assuages the Wynne majority wing 
of the Court’s desire to invalidate instances of harmful economic 
protectionism and to limit instances of double taxation under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  Part IV.B.3 discusses the ways in which the Bridge 
Test incorporates the Wynne dissent wing of the Court’s desire to respect a 
state’s sovereign ability to tax all of its residents’ income within the 
confines of the Constitution.  Part IV.B.4. analyzes the ways in which the 
Bridge Test eschews meaningless distinctions in order to bring together the 
two strands of jurisprudence. 
                                                          
 158.  See supra note 58.  
 159.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795.   
 160.  252 U.S. 37 (1920).  
 161.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1818 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg also 
cites West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 328 U.S. 823 (1946), in which the Court rejected the 
argument that a California tax on net income from interstate commerce violated the Commerce 
Clause.  Id.  
 162.  Shaffer, 252 U.S. at 58–59.  
 163.  Id. at 50.  
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1.  The Bridge Test Satisfies the Wynne Majority Wing’s Desire to 
Invalidate Instances of Harmful Economic Protectionism 
In his majority opinion, Justice Alito clearly asserts that the Commerce 
Clause was intended to “avoid the tendencies toward economic 
Balkanization”164 among the states and to eliminate “the risk of double 
taxation . . . which the commerce clause forbids.”165  The Wynne majority 
wing of the Court can satisfy such interests while still upholding 
Maryland’s controversial tax scheme under the Bridge Test. 
There are no provisions in the Bridge Test that impede the Court’s 
ability to root out economic protectionism.  When assessing if a statute risks 
economic protectionism under the dormant Commerce Clause, courts must 
decide whether the tax scheme is “designed to benefit in-state economic 
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”166 For instance, under the 
Bridge Test, the Court would have no problem replicating the result in 
Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias,167 in which it struck down a state law that 
grants tax exemptions to in-state producers of a good in order to benefit in-
state producers of that good at the expense of out-of-state producers. 
However, under the Bridge Test, the Court would have come to a 
different decision in Wynne while still respecting the wing of the Court that 
believes that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits economic 
protectionism.  The Maryland state tax scheme does not implicate the 
Wynne majority wing of the Court’s desire to utilize the Commerce Clause 
to root out instances economic protectionism  simply because it alone does 
not engage in unconstitutional economic protectionism.  Presumably, a 
protectionist tax scheme is one that “provid[es] a direct commercial 
advantage to local businesses” or “subject[s] interstate commerce to the 
burden of ‘multiple taxation.’”168  However, by levying a tax on income 
earned out of state without offering a credit for taxes paid to other states on 
that income, Maryland’s tax scheme actually burdens many in-state 
interests and does not directly burden out-of-state interests.  Maryland 
residents who have to pay taxes in two states are the actors truly burdened 
by the tax scheme.  These Maryland residents have a direct remedy within 
the political process.  There is no need for the Commerce Clause to strike 
down what is essentially an internal state matter.  Residents of states other 
                                                          
 164.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26, (1979)). 
Economic “Balkanization” is a symptom of economic protectionism that results when “barriers 
[are] so high between the states that the stream of interstate commerce cannot flow over them.”  
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 554 (1949).  
 165.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795 (quoting J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 
(1938)).   
 166.  Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).  
 167.  468 U.S. 263 (1984).   
 168.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1974 (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 
U.S. 450, 458 (1959)).  
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than Maryland are free to earn income in Maryland and pay Maryland 
income taxes at the same rate that Maryland residents do.  Further, 
Maryland itself does not subject interstate commerce to double taxation.  
Whether or not the income earner’s home state decides to offer a credit is 
not Maryland’s concern.  Consequently, the Bridge Test allows the Court to 
utilize the Commerce Clause in instances in which it is the only available 
tool to prevent economic protectionism.  The Bridge Test would uphold 
Maryland’s tax scheme without infringing upon the Commerce Clause’s 
fundamental anti-protectionist purpose. 
However, there are many who argue that Maryland’s tax scheme 
results in economic protectionism that would make “any rational resident 
decide to seek employment solely in-state, or to avoid investing in interstate 
partnerships and S-corporations.”169  Although the Maryland tax scheme 
may well be bad economic policy, such issues are to be determined by state 
legislatures, and thus, the people.170  Clearly, “it is not . . . a purpose of the 
Commerce Clause to protect state residents from their own state taxes.”171  
Yet, even if those who agree with the Wynne majority wing are correct, a 
protectionist statute can nevertheless be “justified by a valid factor 
unrelated to economic protectionism.”172   
The Bridge Test incorporates such a justification by allowing a state 
tax to overcome a failure of the internal consistency test if the interests 
directly burdened by the tax have a remedy in the political process.173  
Although this aspect of the Bridge Test does impinge slightly on the Wynne 
majority wing’s strong view of the Commerce Clause and the internal 
consistency test, it does not significantly damage it.  The Bridge Test would 
still allow the Court to utilize the Commerce Clause to strike down 
instances of economic protectionism where the interests primarily impacted 
by a state tax scheme did not have a remedy in their state’s political 
process.  For instance, in Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp.,174 the Court 
struck down an Iowa statute that “restricts the length of vehicles that use its 
highways” as violating the Commerce Clause.175  Assume, for purposes of 
this example, that rather than a restriction on the length of trucks, Iowa 
imposed a tax on all trucks over sixty feet in length that traveled into the 
state.  Applying the Bridge Test, the Court would still find this facially 
neutral tax unconstitutional.  First, the tax scheme would fail the internal 
consistency test.  If applied by every state in the country, all trucks over 
                                                          
 169.  Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 13, Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. 
Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485).  
 170.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 171.  Id. at 1814 (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989)).  
 172.  Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).  
 173.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 174.  450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
 175.  Id. at 665. 
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sixty feet traveling in interstate commerce would be at a distinct 
disadvantage.  To overcome the presumption of unconstitutionality that 
accompanies a failure of the internal consistency test, the tax must pass 
three factors.  First, the tax must not be facially discriminatory.  Here, the 
tax applies evenly to all trucks over sixty feet.  Second, those primarily 
impacted by the tax must have a remedy in the political process.  Here, the 
tax fails.  The burden of this tax primarily lies upon the trucking companies 
who are located in states outside of Iowa and thus have no potential remedy 
in the Iowa political process.  Consequently, the tax fails the Bridge Test 
and is unconstitutional. 
2.  The Bridge Test Satisfies the Wynne Majority Wing’s Desire to 
Limit Instances of Double Taxation  
The Wynne majority believes that the Commerce Clause forbids 
instances in which interstate commerce is “subjected to the risk of a double 
tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed.”176  The Bridge 
Test proposed by this Note would allow the Wynne majority wing of the 
Court to strike down many instances in which a state tax creates the risk of 
double taxation under the dormant Commerce Clause, while upholding state 
taxes that create a risk of double taxation but do not offend the dormant 
Commerce Clause’s purpose. 
As it is oft noted by proponents of the principal dissent, there is no 
direct constitutional provision against double taxation.177  The Wynne 
majority itself even admits that there are “permissible arrangements that 
might result in double taxation” when such double taxation is the result of 
“two different but nondiscriminatory tax schemes.”178 
                                                          
 176.  J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938).  
 177.  The Constitution does not: 
[R]equire one State, in this case Maryland, to limit its residence-based taxation, should 
the State also choose to exercise, to the full extent, its source-based authority.  States 
often offer their residents credits for income taxes paid to other States, as Maryland 
does for state income tax purposes.  States do so, however, as a matter of tax “policy.” 
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1813–14 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 463 n.12 (1995)).  The “rationales 
for a State taxing its residents’ worldwide income are not diminished by another State’s 
independent interest in ‘requiring contributions from [nonresidents] who realize current pecuniary 
benefits under the protection of the [State’s] government.’” Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1816 (quoting 
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 51 (1920)).  
 178.  Id. at 1804.  The Wynne majority argues that Maryland’s tax scheme is “inherently 
discriminatory” because it fails the internal consistency test.  Id. at 1805.  However, the Bridge 
Test proposed in this Note allows Maryland’s tax scheme to overcome a finding of internal 
inconsistency.  As a result, under the Bridge Test, any risk of double taxation can be seen as 
resulting from the interaction of Maryland’s valid tax scheme with the valid tax schemes of other 
states.   
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Double taxation is primarily objectionable when it “cause[s] 
inequalities between different taxpayers.”179  Maryland’s tax scheme does 
not cause inequalities between tax payers because “the same tax is levied on 
1) residents who earn income in State, 2) residents who earn income out of 
State, and 3) nonresidents who earn income in-State.”180  Accordingly, the 
Wynne majority wing utilizes the internal consistency text to cure tax 
schemes that “place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared 
with commerce intrastate.”181  By incorporating the internal consistency test 
as a threshold aspect of the Bridge Test, the Wynne majority wing of the 
Court will still be able to strike down many instances of economic 
protectionism that result in taxpayer inequalities.  It is only when all three 
of the remaining prongs of the Bridge Test are satisfied that a tax resulting 
in inequalities amongst taxpayers would be upheld.  However, because not 
all instances of double taxation are inherently unconstitutional, the Bridge 
Test leaves room for tax schemes like Maryland’s to remain valid. 
3.  The Bridge Test Satisfies the Wynne Dissent Wing’s Desire to 
Respect a State’s Sovereign Ability to Tax Resident Income 
Within the Confines of the Constitution 
In her principal dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg articulates a 
principle fundamental to her strand of jurisprudence: a state may “tax ‘all 
the income of its residents, even the income earned outside the taxing 
jurisdiction.’”182  Because the Bridge Test allows a presumptively 
unconstitutional tax to be deemed valid, the level of scrutiny in assessing 
state tax schemes is increased. 
There is nothing in the Constitution, or in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that requires one of two taxing states to “recede simply 
because both have lawful tax regimes reaching the same income.”183  For 
instance, the Court in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair184 found that the 
disparity between two taxing states “can only be the combined effect” of 
both statutes and the state in which the income was earned “is not 
responsible.”185 
By applying the internal consistency test strictly, the Wynne Court 
found that Maryland’s tax should be the one to recede, despite the fact that 
it would be constitutional without the presence of the other state’s tax 
                                                          
 179.  Carl C. Plehn, Double Taxation, 11 PUB. POL’Y 284, 286 (1904). 
 180.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804.   
 181.  Id. at 1803.  
 182.  Id. at 1798 (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462–63 
(1995)).   
 183.  Id. at 1813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 184.  437 U.S. 267 (1978). 
 185.  Id. at 277 n.12. 
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scheme.  The Bridge Test, however, would not force Maryland “to limit its 
residence-based taxation,”186 and thus, its sovereign ability to tax.  On the 
contrary, it affords states the sovereignty to tax its residents’ income earned 
out of state without having to worry about how the other states choose to 
tax.  Here, a state’s ability to tax is limited only by the principles underlying 
the dormant Commerce Clause or a tax that discriminates on its face and 
affords no remedy for those burdened in the political process. 
It must be noted, however, that a lenient application of the internal 
consistency test means only that a failure can be overcome by the 
satisfaction of multiple other factors.  Should one of the remaining factors 
not be satisfied, the state tax scheme is unconstitutional.  For instance, if 
Maryland taxed residents of other states earning income in Maryland at a 
higher rate than Maryland citizens earning income at home, the tax would 
fail both the “facially discriminatory” and the “political process” prongs of 
the Bridge Test and be unconstitutional. 
State governments have a multitude of financial and economic 
responsibilities to their tax-paying residents.187  In fact, “States long favored 
their residents over non-residents in the provision of local services.”188  As 
such, Maryland’s financial and economic rationales for “taxing its 
residents’ worldwide incomes are not diminished by another State’s 
independent interest in ‘requiring contributions from [nonresidents] who 
realize current pecuniary benefits under the protection of the [State’s] 
government.’”189  Consequently, a state can hardly afford for its tax, which 
would be constitutional if assessed independently of other states’ 
commensurate taxes, to be deemed invalid under the Commerce Clause.190 
The Bridge Test also restricts the Commerce Clause to its proper 
scope.  In Goldberg v. Sweet191 the Court held that “it is not a purpose of 
the Commerce Clause to protect state residents from their own state 
taxes.”192  By granting states greater autonomy in taxing all of their 
residents’ income, the Bridge Test works within the confines of the dormant 
Commerce Clause while respecting the Wynne dissent wing of the Court’s 
desire to maintain state sovereignty to tax. 
                                                          
 186.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1813–14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 187.  Id. at 1814 (“According to the State’s Comptroller, for example, in 2012 Maryland and 
its local government spent over $11 billion to fund public schools, $4 billion for state health 
programs, and $1.1 billion for the State’s food supplemental program—all programs available to 
residents only.”).  
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. at 1816 (quoting Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 51 (1920)).  
 190.  The Wynne decision leaves Maryland “and its counties on the hook for as much as $200 
million in refunds” and will cause it to face “significant cuts in revenue.”  Turque, supra note 9. 
 191.  488 U.S. 232 (1989).  
 192.  Id. at 266.  
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4.  The Bridge Test Eschews Meaningless Distinctions in Order to 
Bring Together the Two Strands of Jurisprudence 
One of the Wynne Court’s major failings is that the majority and 
principal dissent adopt their strand of jurisprudence’s long-held positions.  
Rather than bridging the gap between them, the majority and principal 
dissenting opinions spar over legal disputes that appeared to be settled.  The 
Bridge Test allows bygones to be bygones simply by accepting what has 
been decided when there is no significant case law to refute the conclusion.  
Such acceptance causes divisions between the strands of jurisprudence to 
vanish, helping to bring about a consistent way to decide issues of state 
taxation. 
The Wynne majority points to three cases, JD Adams, Gwin, and 
Central Greyhound as central cases in which the Court “struck down a state 
tax scheme that might have resulted in the double taxation of income earned 
out of the State and that discriminated in favor of intrastate over interstate 
economic activity.”193  However, the principal dissent attempts to 
distinguish these cases on the ground that they involved a tax on gross 
receipts rather than a tax on net income.194  Although the distinction was 
once meaningful,195 taxes on gross receipts and net income have now been 
“placed on an equal footing.”196  Purposefully, the Bridge Test makes no 
mention of such a distinction in order to eliminate it, once and for all. 
In furtherance of its strand of jurisprudence’s desire to eliminate tax 
schemes that “[operate] as a tariff,”197 the majority opinion likens 
Maryland’s tax scheme to a tariff and considers it “inherently 
discriminatory” on that basis.198  While the majority is clear in 
characterizing tariffs as “the paradigmatic example of a law discriminating 
against interstate commerce,”199 the majority failed to mention what a tariff 
actually is.  A tariff “taxes interstate activity at a higher rate than it taxes the 
same activity conducted within the state”200 and “handicap[s] out-of-state 
competitors.”  Consequently, the Bridge Test’s provision causing a state tax 
scheme to be unconstitutional if it is facially discriminatory will stamp out 
                                                          
 193.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795.  
 194.  Id.  
 195.  Id. at 1796 (Noting that the “distinction between taxes on gross receipts and net income 
was based on the notion, endorsed in some early cases, that a tax on gross receipts is an 
impermissible ‘direct and immediate burden’ on interstate commerce, whereas a tax on net income 
is merely an ‘indirect and incidental’ burden” (quoting U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 
U.S. 321, 328–29 (1918))).  
 196.  2 C. TROST & P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 
2D § 9:1, at 212 (2003). 
 197.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804.  
 198.  Id.   
 199.  Id. (quoting W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994)).  
 200.  Id. at 1821 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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instances of impermissible state tariffs.201  However, Maryland’s income 
tax scheme taxes its residents’ income “at precisely the same rate, whether 
income is earned in or out-of-state.”202  Thus, it is quite clear that, despite 
the Wynne majority’s forceful contention, Maryland’s tax scheme is not 
functionally equivalent to a tariff. 
C.  The Bridge Test Creates a Consistent and Unifying Method for 
Deciding the Constitutionality of State Tax Schemes  
In order to bring together two long-standing strands of state tax-related 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Bridge Test selects valued principles 
from each strand in order to create a consistent way to decide state taxation 
cases in the future.  In order to create a test agreeable to both sides, the 
Bridge Test incorporates some of the fundamental aspects of both strands so 
that neither has significant aspects of their ideology left out.  In an attempt 
to satisfy the Wynne majority’s strand, the Bridge Test incorporates the 
internal consistency test as a threshold and the external consistency test as a 
backup plan of sorts.  In order to satisfy the Wynne principal dissent’s 
strand, the Bridge Test allows a failure of the internal consistency test to be 
overcome by certain factors that prevent the tax from being overly 
burdensome on interstate commerce or those for whom the tax principally 
affects.  Part IV.C.1 discusses the way in which the Bridge Test applies the 
internal consistency test leniently.  Part IV.C.2 discusses how the Bridge 
Test allows for a state tax to overcome a presumption of unconstitutionality 
if it is not facially discriminatory and if the interest most directly burdened 
by the tax has a remedy in the political process.  Part IV.C.3 of this Note 
discusses the way in which the Bridge Test’s use of the external consistency 
test ensures that any state tax scheme under review fairly reflects a state’s 
taxing interest. 
1.  The Bridge Test Applies the Internal Consistency Test Leniently  
In deciding the constitutionality of Maryland’s state tax scheme under 
the dormant Commerce Clause, the Wynne Court focuses almost entirely on 
the internal consistency test.  The Court plainly stated that, “Maryland’s 
income tax scheme fails the internal consistency test.”203 However, the 
Court does not consider that, based on Supreme Court jurisprudence, there 
are situations in which the internal consistency test need not be applied 
strictly. 
                                                          
 201.  W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 193. 
 202.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1822.   
 203.  Id. at 1803.  
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In American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service 
Commission,204 Michigan imposed a flat fee on trucks transporting 
interstate goods.205  The taxpayers engaged in the interstate commerce 
challenged the fee on the grounds that it “bore more heavily on trucks 
engaged in interstate commerce . . . than on trucks engaged only in 
intrastate commerce.”206  The Supreme Court upheld Michigan’s fee under 
the Commerce Clause despite the fact that it “concede[dly]” failed the 
internal consistency test.207 
The Bridge Test proposed in this Note adopts a similarly lenient use of 
the internal consistency test as that in American Trucking II.208  Under the 
Bridge Test, an internally inconsistent state tax scheme is presumptively 
unconstitutional.  However, such a presumption can be overcome by the 
satisfaction of other factors,209 reflecting a situation in which a state tax 
does not violate the fundamental purposes of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
It is true that the internal consistency test is beneficial in assessing the 
constitutionality of tax scheme.  Some would argue that the Wynne Court’s 
use of the internal consistency test prevented the states from gaining the 
“tools to ‘Balkanize’ the national economy.”210  Because the Bridge Test 
utilizes the internal consistency test as a critical threshold, it incorporated 
the Wynne majority’s desire to prevent instances of double taxation that 
result in economic isolationism amongst the states.  A failure of the internal 
consistency test can only be overcome in a narrow set of circumstances  that 
implicate the fundamental purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause to 
protect the burdened out-of-state interests without a voice in the political 
process. 
A strict use of the internal consistency test when assessing the 
constitutionality of state tax schemes that create a potential burden of 
double taxation would be inappropriate.  The internal consistency test looks 
                                                          
 204.  545 U.S. 429 (2005). 
 205.  Id. at 431. 
 206.  Hellerstein, supra note 152, at 26. 
 207.  American Trucking II, 545 U.S. at 438.   
 208.  It is clear that the ruling in American Trucking II itself would not have had an impact on 
the decision in Wynne absent the Bridge Test.  The Bridge Test uses the principles espoused in 
American Trucking in order to reach a different conclusion in Wynne.  Hellerstein, supra note 152, 
at 34 (“American Trucking does not appear to have any direct impact on decisions holding that an 
insufficiently protective tax credit fails to provide a remedy for an internally inconsistent tax.  
There is certainly nothing in American Trucking II that can be read to modify the basic 
proposition that tax credits ordinarily provide a defense to any claim that a tax is internally 
inconsistent.”).   
 209.  See infra Part IV.C.2.  
 210.  Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, Comptroller v. Wynne: Internal Consistency, a 
National Marketplace, and Limits on State Sovereignty to Tax, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 267, 
283 (2015). 
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to “the structure of the tax at issue to see whether its identical application 
by every state in the Union would place interstate commerce at a 
disadvantage when compared with commerce intrastate.”211  However, this 
speculative assumption in the Wynne case creates a hypothetical situation 
that is impossible to exist. 
Assume that forty-nine states in the Union taxed as Maryland did 
before the Wynne decision.  In the real world, the only state that did not tax 
as Maryland did would never decide to change its taxing scheme to 
conform with the other forty-nine.  Accepting the logic of the Wynne 
majority, the lone state would surely be a haven for businesses that wish to 
operate in interstate commerce and avoid “oppressive” double taxation.  
The Wynne majority itself claimed not to “decide the constitutionality of a 
hypothetical tax scheme . . . because such a scheme is not before us.”212  By 
allowing a failure of the internal consistency test to be overcome, the 
Bridge Test follows the Wynne majority’s own advice. 
The Court’s ruling in American Trucking II makes it clear that a 
lenient application of the internal consistency test is permissible.  Noted tax 
scholar, Professor Walter Hellerstein, indicated that “the Court’s disposition 
of the internal consistency claim in American Trucking II marks a clear 
retreat from the internal consistency doctrine as explicated in earlier 
cases.”213  Because the Court in American Trucking II “looked the 
implications of the internal consistency doctrine square in the eye and 
blinked” it tacitly gives the Court the ability to do so in other decisions.214  
The Bridge Test proposed in this Note endorses this move by the Court. 
The facts in Wynne present an instance in which the Court should 
again blink at the implications of a strict application of the internal 
consistency test.  A strict application would most directly result in an 
overreach into the political process215 and an erosion of a state’s 
sovereignty to tax,216 especially in a situation that implicates the purpose of 
the Commerce Clause to protect burdened out-of-state interests without a 
voice in the political process. 
                                                          
 211.  Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 212.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1806. 
 213.  Hellerstein, supra note 152, at 26. 
 214.  The author acknowledges that the facts in American Trucking II and Wynne are not 
analogous.  This Note does not attempt to liken the two cases.  The Bridge Test simply adopts the 
idea that a tax’s failure of the internal consistency test should not automatically result in that tax’s 
unconstitutionality.  
 215.  See infra Part IV.C.2.  
 216.  See supra Part IV.B.3.  
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2.  The Bridge Test Allows a State Tax to Overcome the 
Presumption of Unconstitutionality  
The internal consistency test is simply intended to ensure “fairness in 
an income tax apportionment formula.”217  However, this test “asks nothing 
about the degree of economic reality reflected by the tax” and has “evolved 
into a robust doctrine barring any state tax” that fails.218  Consequently, the 
Court needs a safety valve for when the internal inconsistency test 
overreaches, as it does in the Wynne case. 
The Bridge Test allows the internal consistency test to be overcome if 
a state tax scheme is not facially discriminatory.  It is clear that “state laws 
discriminating against interstate commerce on their face are ‘virtually per se 
invalid.’”219  Facially discriminatory taxes “‘mollif[y]’ some of the ‘in-state 
interests [that] would otherwise lobby against’ it.”220 
Even-handed taxes, or, those that are not facially discriminatory,221 are 
typically upheld because “the existence of major in-state interests adversely 
effected . . . is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse.”222  Because 
the Commerce Clause is intended to protect the free flow of commerce 
amongst the states, the Court need not have a hand in striking down a law 
that primarily burdens in-state actors when the legislature and thus, the 
people, could do so themselves.223  The double taxation burden that the 
Wynne majority wing of the Court warns of here is actually on the in-state 
interests with a voice in the political process, not on interstate commerce 
itself.224 
Consequently, the Bridge Test’s inclusion of a provision respecting the 
political process allows the state the sovereignty to make an independent 
policy decision.225  However, the Wynne majority need not fear.  A state 
                                                          
 217.  Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983). 
 218.  Hellerstein, supra note 152, at 2. 
 219.  Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996) (quoting Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)). 
 220.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Lynn Creamery v. 
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994)).  
 221.  Id. (holding “state efforts to tax residents at a higher rate for out-of-state activities than 
for in state activities (or to exempt from taxation only in-state activities)” constitutes a facially 
discriminatory tax scheme, whereas even handed taxes, as their name suggests, tax everyone at the 
same rate). 
 222.  Id. (quoting W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 200).   
 223.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428 (1819) (“The people of a state . . . 
give to their government a right of taxing themselves and their property, and as exigencies of 
government cannot be limited, they proscribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting 
confidently on the interest of the legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their 
representative, to guard then against its abuse.”). 
 224.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1814–15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
 225.  Id. at 1816 (“States deciding whether to tax residents’ entire worldwide income must 
choose between legitimate but competing tax policy objectives.  A State might prioritize obtaining 
equal contributions from those who benefit from the State’s protection in roughly similar ways.  
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very well “might prioritize ensuring that its residents are not subject to 
double taxation”226 in order to create incentives for economic activity.  A 
great many states with economic needs different from those of Maryland 
will surely make that choice.  However, it is not the responsibility of the 
Court to “[strike] the right balance between these two [tax] policy 
objectives.”227 Such a responsibility has “belonged to the States” for “at 
least a century.”228  The Bridge Test respects that tradition of state 
sovereignty by allowing for the internal consistency test to be overcome 
when the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause is not implicated. 
3.  The Use of the External Consistency Test Ensures That Any 
State Tax Scheme Under Review Fairly Reflects a State’s 
Taxing Interest 
Under the Complete Auto test, the external consistency test229 looks to 
the “economic justification for the State’s claim upon the value taxed, to 
discover whether the State’s tax reaches beyond that portion of the value 
that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing state.”230  
However, because the external consistency test is traditionally only used 
when a tax has already passed the internal consistency test,231 the Wynne 
Court ended their analysis after finding that Maryland’s tax scheme was 
internally inconsistent. 
In ensuring whether a tax is fairly apportioned, both the internal and 
external consistency of a tax should be considered.  Under the Bridge Test, 
should a tax be considered internally inconsistent and thus presumptively 
unconstitutional, such a finding can be overcome in part by a finding that 
the tax is externally consistent. 
The utilization of the external consistency test satisfies the goals of the 
Bridge Test because it incorporates significant values that each of the 
strands of jurisprudence hold.  It satisfies the Wynne majority wing by 
giving it yet another tool by which it might strike down a state tax scheme 
that creates the possibility of double taxation.232  On the other hand, it 
                                                          
Or a Sate might prioritize ensuring that its taxpayers are not subject to double taxation.  A State 
cannot, however, accomplish both objectives at once.”); see also id. (“For at least a century, 
responsibility for striking the right balance between these two policy objectives has belonged to 
the States (and Congress), not this Court.”).  
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id.  
 228.  Id. 
 229.  See supra text accompanying notes 80–82.  
 230.  Okla. Tax. Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995).  
 231.  Md. State Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 431 Md. 147, 171 n.21, 64 A.3d 453, 
467 n.21 (2013).   
 232.  In Nw. Energetic Services, LLC v. Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 159 Cal. App. 4th 841, 864 
(2008), the court found that a California levy LLC registered in state violated the external 
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satisfies the Wynne principal dissent’s wing by allowing it to further define 
exactly what value is fairly attributable to a state’s economic activity.233  
Frankly, both strands of jurisprudence might appreciate the Bridge Test’s 
inclusion of the external consistency test because there has not been a 
significant amount of Supreme Court jurisprudence applying it.234  For 
instance, Wynne did not reach the issue of external consistency and the 
Maryland Court of Appeals touched on external consistency only briefly.235  
As such, each wing of the Court is likely to see the external consistency test 
as malleable and able to be mended to suit their own interests. 
Although not decided in the Supreme Court,236 it is the opinion of this 
Note that, given the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue as well as the 
facts at hand, the Maryland tax scheme is externally consistent.  Because 
the Wynne Court concedes that “Maryland could remedy its infirmity in its 
tax scheme by offering, as most States do, a credit for income taxes paid to 
other states,”237 it acknowledges that income earned out of state by 
Maryland residents is “fairly attributable to economic activity within the 
taxing state”238 and thus, can reasonably be taxed.  Importantly, the Court 
does not argue that Maryland’s county tax is not fairly attributable because 
it may not tax its residents’ income earned out of state at all. 
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines,239 the Court laid out 
some of the boundaries of the external consistency test.  Most relevant to 
the discussion at hand was the Court’s proclamation that “the threat of real 
                                                          
consistency test because the levy was “based on non-California income, not attributable to 
activities in California” and amounted to “extraterritorial taxation.” 
 233.  Given its interest in state sovereignty, the Wynne dissent wing would likely seek to 
ensure that a broad range of economic value is attributable to a state’s economic activity.  Of 
course, depending on the votes on the Court, such a definition could swing the other way, 
allowing the Wynne majority wing to narrowly define what economic value is fairly attributable to 
a state’s economy.  
 234.  See Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 380 (1991) (finding that the 
external consistency test can be applied to the apportionment of a value added tax); Container 
Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 180–81 (1983) (applying the external 
consistency test to a California corporate franchise tax that applied the “unitary business 
principle” in apportionment); Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 262 (1989) (applying the external 
consistency test to an Illinois state tax on interstate telecommunications); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. 
Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 185–89 (1995) (applying the external consistency test to an 
Oklahoma sales tax on the price of bus travel from Oklahoma to another state). 
 235.  The Supreme Court in Wynne only mentions external consistency in reference to the 
Maryland Court of Appeals’ holding.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 
1793 (2015).  The Maryland Court of Appeals opined that “the operation of the county tax appears 
to create external inconsistency.”  Wynne, 431 Md. at 172, 64 A.3d at 467. 
 236.  Wynne, 431 Md. at 172, 64 A.3d at 467 (holding the issue of external consistency was, 
however, decided in the Maryland Court of Appeals).  Contrary to the assertions of this Note, the 
Court of Appeals found that “the operation of the county tax appears to create external 
inconsistency.”  Id.  
 237.  Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1805.  
 238.  Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185.  
 239.  Id.   
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multiple taxation . . . may indicate a State’s impermissible overreaching.”240 
However, the Court has not yet discussed exactly what threats of multiple 
taxation might result in impermissible overreaching in the context of 
overlapping state taxes.  In their Wynne decision, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals even noted that, despite finding the Maryland tax scheme internally 
inconsistent, it would discuss external consistency “given the possibility 
that dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence will continue to develop” on 
this issue.241 
Consequently, the issue becomes whether the interaction of 
Maryland’s tax scheme with that of other states creates the possibility of 
multiple taxation that constitutes “impermissible overreaching.”242  
Although Jefferson Lines implies that such an overreach may occur broadly, 
its scope is clearly defined in both Container Corp. of America v. Franchise 
Tax Board243 and Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles.244  The Court 
in Japan Line narrowly construed the context in which a tax might be 
deemed to impermissibly overreach, stating that the “overlapping of a tax” 
is a problem that “might be deemed de minimis in a domestic context.”245  
Here, the state tax scheme, justified both by the fact that it is not facially 
discriminatory and that those primarily burdened have a voice in the 
political process, can safely avoid the label of an impermissible overreach. 
Further, in Container Corp., the Court argues that it should not 
undergo the “essentially legislative” task of eliminating all overlapping 
taxation.246  A task, it adds, that would require the Court to “establish not 
only a single constitutionally mandated method of taxation, but also rules 
regarding the application of that method to particular cases.”247 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, the United States Supreme 
Court concluded that Maryland’s “county” tax was unconstitutional because 
it discriminated against interstate commerce and failed the internal 
consistency test by subjecting Maryland residents earning income out of 
state to double taxation.248  The two competing strands of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on issues of state taxation, exemplified by the majority and 
                                                          
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Wynne, 431 Md. at 171 n.21, 64 A.3d 453.   
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 243.  463 U.S. 159 (1983). 
 244.  441 U.S. 434 (1979).  
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 248.  Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).  
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principal dissent in Wynne, continued their long-standing Commerce Clause 
fight.  In order to prevent the continuance of two different types of 
decisions on the same state taxation issues, this Note proposes a Bridge Test 
that incorporates the constitutional principles as well as the common 
deciding factors of each of the strands of jurisprudence.249  The Wynne 
majority favored the a strict use of the internal consistency test too greatly 
and incorrectly ignored the holding in American Trucking II that would 
have allowed it to utilize the internal consistency test more leniently.250  
Consequently, the Bridge Test proposed in this Note allows a failure of the 
internal consistency test to be overcome when the tax scheme is not facially 
discriminatory and the interests directly burdened have a remedy in the 
political process.251  Such flexibility allows a state tax, such as the 
Maryland tax at issue in Wynne, to survive constitutional challenges based 
on the dormant Commerce Clause because the potential burden of double 
taxation no longer violates the dormant Commerce Clause.252  Further, the 
Bridge Test incorporates the external consistency test in order to give courts 
an extra tool to determine whether or not the state tax scheme in question is 
fairly apportioned.253   
Under the Bridge Test, Maryland’s county tax would be constitutional, 
allowing it and similar states the sovereignty to tax without fear that another 
state’s tax might invalidate their own.  The Bridge Test brings together two 
long-at-odds strands of Supreme Court jurisprudence, creating a consistent 
and replicable method for applying the Commerce Clause to issues of state 
taxation now and into the future. 
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